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Abstract 
 
Google Suggest is a service incorporated within Google Web Search which was 
created to help user find the right search phrase by proposing the auto-
completing popular phrases while typing. The paper presents a new network 
steganography method called StegSuggest which utilizes suggestions generated 
by Google Suggest as a hidden data carrier. The detailed description of the 
method’s idea is backed up with the analysis of the network traffic generated by 
the Google Suggest to prove its feasibility. The traffic analysis was also per-
formed to discover the occurrence of two TCP options: Window Scale and 
Timestamp which StegSuggest uses to operate. Estimation of method ste-
ganographic bandwidth proves that it is possible to insert 100 bits of ste-
ganogram into every suggestions list sent by Google Suggest service. 
1   Introduction 
The main aim of network steganography is to hide secret data (ste-
ganograms) in the normal transmissions of users. In ideal situation hidden data 
exchange cannot be detected by third parties. Network steganography may be 
easily utilized as a tool for data exfiltration or to enable network attacks [2]. 
Contrary to typical steganographic methods that utilize digital media 
(pictures, audio and video files) as a cover for hidden data (steganogram), net-
work steganography utilizes communication protocols’ control elements and 
their basic intrinsic functionality. Typical steganographic methods have proven 
to be useful tools for data exfiltration e.g. in 2008 IEEE Spectrum magazine [3] 
wrote that “someone at the United States Department of Justice smuggled sensi-
tive financial data out of the agency by embedding the data in several image 
files”; this year the same magazine [4] reported that the Russian spy ring was 
uncovered which used similar steganographic techniques. However embedding 
secret data into images has two serious drawbacks: it allows hiding limited 
amount of data per one file and the modified picture may be accessible for fo-
rensics experts (e.g. because it was uploaded to some kind of server). With 
network steganography it is different; it allows leaking information (even very 
slowly) during long periods and if all the exchanged traffic is not captured than 
there is nothing left for forensics experts to analyse. As a result, such methods 
are harder to detect and eliminate from networks. In order to minimize the po-
tential threat to public security, identification of such methods is important as 
the development of effective detection (steganalysis) methods. This requires 
both in-depth understanding of the functionality of network protocols and ways 
in which it can be used for steganography. 
The best carrier for secret messages (steganograms) must have two fea-
tures. Firstly, it should be popular i.e. usage such carrier should not be consid-
ered as an anomaly itself. The more such carriers are present and utilized in 
network it’s the better because they mask using the carrier to perform hidden 
communication. Secondly, modification of the carrier related to inserting the 
steganogram should not be “visible” to third party not aware of the ste-
ganographic procedure. 
And how to find a carrier in the network traffic that would fill above-
mentioned requirements? In the Internet today we witness expansion of differ-
ent, advanced Internet services from e-commerce such as Amazon, eBay to 
information and social web sites (like Twitter, Flickr, MySpace, iGoogle, Wik-
ipedia, Facebook). They all incorporate advanced Web 2.0 mechanisms [1] for 
customizable content presentation, sharing and delivery and they all have tre-
mendous number of users. And they all use network protocols, sometimes very 
complex, to realize these services. Thus, they are perfect candidates for secret 
data carriers. 
In this paper we propose a new steganographic method StegSuggest, 
which exploits popular Google Suggest service traffic to perform hidden com-
munication.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Ajax 
(Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) group of technologies which was used to 
create Google Suggest service. Section 3 describes related work. Section 4 pre-
sents experimental results for real-life LAN (Local Area Network) traffic which 
permit for an evaluation of feasibility of the proposed solution. Section 5 dis-
cusses the proposed information hiding system in detail. Finally, Section 6 con-
cludes our work. 
2   Ajax and Google Suggest Service 
Ajax is a group of interrelated web development techniques used on the 
client-side to create interactive web applications. Ajax incorporates technologies 
like: HTML/XHTML and CSS (Cascading Style Sheets), Document Object 
Model and XML (Extensible Markup Language), XMLHttpRequest object for 
asynchronous communication and JavaScript. Web applications using Ajax are 
able to retrieve data from the server asynchronously without disrupting the dis-
play and behaviour of the currently loaded page. 
 
Fig. 1 Google Suggest example for search phrase steganos 
 
Google Suggest is a service created using Ajax and incorporated within 
Google Web Search – the most popular web search engine in the Internet.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Google Suggest HTTP GET request message 
 
Google Suggest was created to help user find the right search phrase by 
proposing auto-completing popular phrases while typing (Fig. 1). From the 
network protocol perspective Google Suggest uses HTTP and TCP protocols, 
the same as are used for typical web page exchange. The algorithm behind this 
service works as follows: 
When user begins typing a search phrase into the search field, once in a 
while, these characters are sent to Google server in HTTP GET message (Fig. 
2). 
Google server returns a list of the most popular search phrases in HTTP 
OK message (Fig. 3).  The list is then presented to the user in a drop-down list. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Google Suggest HTTP OK message with proposed suggestions 
 
While the user is typing, HTTP GET messages are sent frequently (Fig. 
4). This means that during search for particular phrase numerous of HTTP mes-
sages will be exchanged (GETs with user typed characters and OKs with sug-
gestions in return). 
 
 
Fig. 4 Exchange of HTTP GET and OK messages during typing the search 
phrase steganos 
 
Each HTTP request may carry at least one or more characters of the 
search phrase depending on the user’s typing speed (Fig. 5). 
 
  
 
 Fig. 5 The number of the new characters in HTTP requests depending on user’s 
typing speed 
3. Related Work 
To authors’ best knowledge there are no steganographic methods proposed for 
such services like Google Suggest. However, proposed steganographic method, 
StegSuggest, modifies mainly two network protocols: con-tent of HTTP mes-
sages containing suggestions and TCP header options: Windows Scale (WS) 
and Timestamp (TS), and for both protocols steganographic methods were pro-
posed. This section review steganographic method that may be applied to TCP 
header and HTTP protocol messages. 
 
TCP 
Giffin et al. in [5] proposed steganographic method which utilizes TCP 
timestamp header option, which is commonly used to improve TCP perfor-
mance. The steganograms are inserted into the low order bits of the sender 
timestamps (similar method is a part of StegSuggest). In [6] Handel and Sanford 
proposed to enable secret communication by using the unused bits of the TCP 
header’s Flags field. Hintz proposed a method that transmits steganograms in 
the TCP Urgent Pointer [7]. In [8] Fisk et al. introduced steganographic meth-
ods which modify TCP Reset segments and TCP header padding. For TCP ISN 
(Initial Sequence Number) few steganographic methods were proposed e.g. by 
Rowland [9], Rutkowska [10] and Murdoch et al. [11]. Abad de-scribed on the 
example of IP header how to utilize Checksum field for covert communication 
[12] – the same method is applicable also for the TCP header checksum.  
 
HTTP 
In [13] Bauer proposed hiding information in JavaScript/HTML and transport-
ing it through the use of JavaScript redirects. Various methods for utilizing 
HTTP protocol headers for steganographic purposes were proposed by Dyatlov 
et al., Kwecka and Van Horenbeeck [16–18]. In [19] Castro et al. introduced 
new steganographic method which uses HTTP cookies to hide steganograms. 
Feamster et al. in [14] proposed sending covert requests for web pages encoded 
as a sequence of HTTP requests to innocent web sites and return the content 
hidden inside harmless images. Bowyer in [15] proposed a similar technique to 
enable communication with Trojans behind firewalls. 
4. Google Suggest in Real Network Traffic 
To analyse the characteristic and the volume of traffic that Google Suggest 
generate the real network traffic was captured from LAN. The experiment was 
conducted at the Institute of Telecommunications at Warsaw University of 
Technology between 5 of November and 14 of December 2010 (from Mondays 
to Fridays). The traffic was captured with the aid of Dumpcap which is part of 
the Wireshark sniffer ver. 1.3.3 (www.wireshark.org). The sources of traffic 
were ordinary computer devices placed in several university laboratories and 
employees’ ones but also peripherals, servers and network equipment. To ana-
lyse the captured traffic and calculate statistics TShark (which is also part of 
Wireshark) was utilized. 
 
4.1 HTTP requests 
We want to explore how many Google searches i.e. looking for the particular 
search phrases, are performed for average user, how many Google Suggest 
HTTP requests are involved during average search and how many searches per 
hour does average user generate?  
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The analysis of the real Google search requests revealed that there were 
nine types of request which depended on where Google client resided: hp (the 
search was initiated on main Google web search page), serp (the search was 
performed on previously returned search results), tbrs  (the search was initiated 
from installed Google toolbar), firefox, ie, chrome, safari (the search was per-
formed using web browsers and embedded Google toolbar), img (the search 
target were digital images), youtube (the searches come from youtube.com site). 
The total number of HTTP requests and for each Google client is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Google Suggest HTTP requests statistics in captured traffic  
Client Total hp serp firefox safari chrome youtube  ie tbrs img unspec. 
No. of 
request 18921 7857 4830 1616 1146 1057 985 945 354 95 36 
[%] 100 41.53 25.53 8.54 6.06 5.59 5.21 4.99 1.87 0.50 0.19 
 
 
Fig. 6 The number of average Google searches for different time of day  
(from 9 am to 5 pm) 
 
From captured LAN traffic we took into account only traffic from users 
which generated less than 5 Google searches.  For the remaining users the fol-
lowing results were acquired which are presented in Table 2. 
For calculating number of Google searches per hour we chose only 
working hours between 9 am and 5 pm. Results reveal that average user gener-
ates about 61 searches, where each consists, on average, of about 7 HTTP mes-
sages. User generated single Google search, on average, every three hours, 
which is in fact quite surprising as it is such popular tool. The average Google 
searches activity of users during different time of the day is presented in Fig. 6. 
 
Table 2 Google Suggest statistics in captured traffic (averages) 
 
No. of Google 
searches/user 
No. of HTTP 
requests/user 
No. of HTTP 
req./Google search 
No. of Google 
searches/h 
No. 61.4 415 7.1 0.31 
Stand. 
Dev. 107.1 745 3.5 0.53 
 
4.2 TCP Windows Scale and Timestamp options 
Traffic analysis was also performed to establish occurrence of the TCP seg-
ments related to Google Suggest service (with SYN or SYN with ACK flags) 
that had options Window Scale (WS) and Timestamp (TS) set.  
The Window Scale option can be attached only to a SYN segment. It 
has two purposes [Error! Reference source not found.]:  
• indicates that the TCP is prepared to perform both send and receive 
window scaling, 
• advertises a scale factor to be applied to its receiving window; TCP 
segment that is prepared to scale windows should send the option, even 
if its own scale factor is 1 (the scale factor is limited to a power of two 
and encoded logarithmically). 
 
The TS option is used for two mechanisms: RTTM (Round Trip Time 
Measurement) and PAWS (Protect Against Wrapped Sequences) [21].  
Detailed results of the analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3 TCP WS and TS options occurrence 
 SYN SYN with WS 
set 
SYN with TS 
option 
No. 3989 2422 1032 
[%] 100 60.7 25.9 
 
Table 4 TCP WS values and TS presence 
WS 
values 
SYN with WS 
value [%] 
SYN with WS val. 
and TS option [%] 
0 0 0 
1 14.46 86.31 
2 30.38 1.57 
3 2.11 100 
6 10.29 100 
7 0.53 100 
8 2.96 0 
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It turned out that from all TCP SYN segments around 60% had WS op-
tion and around 26% of segments had TS option set. Each segment with TS 
option set had also WS option. For SYN segments with WS values equal 3, 6 
and 7 all had TS option active, for WS 0 and 8 none. 
5. StegSuggest: Communication Scenarios and Idea 
To enable hidden communication StegSuggest utilizes traffic generated by 
Google Suggest. Its main innovation is to insert new words into suggestions sent 
to the Google Suggest client.  
Inserted words carry bits of steganogram. In this section we describe 
hidden communication scenarios for StegSuggest (5.1), how steganogram is 
en(de)coded into original Google suggestions (5.2), how StegSuggest operates 
in detail (5.3), and finally we estimate its potential bandwidth (5.4). 
 
5.1 Steganographic communication scenarios 
All possible hidden communication scenarios for StegSuggest are presented in 
Fig. 7. From these four scenarios only (a) and (b) are feasible ones. In both 
scenarios some intermediate network node is a steganogram sender and ste-
ganogram receiver is also intermediate network node (a) or Google Suggest 
client (b).  
 
Fig. 7 Possible hidden data transmission scenarios 
 
It is worth noting that in scenario (a) both sides of overt communica-
tion (Google Suggest server and client) are not aware of hidden communication. 
Moreover, in this scenario it is possible that steganograms sender (SS) and ste-
ganogram receiver (SR) can utilize the whole Google Suggest traffic coming 
from particular LAN for steganographic purposes and thus achieve higher ste-
ganographic bandwidth. 
In scenarios (c) and (d) it is assumed that Google Suggest server takes 
part in steganographic communication as a steganogram sender. Unless such 
server is a victim of some kind of the network attack such situation is unlikely 
to happen.  
In the rest of the paper StegSuggest is described for scenario (a) from 
Fig. 7. It is assumed that SS and SR are capable of capturing the whole Google 
Suggest traffic between Google server and clients that are located e.g. in partic-
ular LAN. This gives opportunity for hidden communication based on aggregat-
ed Google Suggest traffic which originates from many Google Suggest clients 
and is destined for one or more Google servers (Fig. 8). 
 
 
Fig. 8 StegSuggest transmission scenario 
 
5.2 Steganogram encoding and decoding 
StegSuggest utilises original suggestions sent by the Google Suggest server to 
transfer steganograms. It is achieved by adding words to the original sugges-
tions sent to the Google client. Adding new words to the generated suggestions 
by Google Suggest service is hard to detect because sometimes the suggestions 
are strange and/or unexpected (examples – Fig. 9 – many Internet sites are de-
voted exclusively to track such meaningless suggestions). 
 
  
Fig. 9 Examples of the strange and funny Google suggestions 
(http://www.boredpanda.com) 
 
The key issue for StegSuggest to be able to evade disclosure is to de-
sign a proper codebook from which the steganographic words (which we called 
steg-suggestions) will be chosen. Such codebook should fulfil following two 
requirements: 
• R1: only the most popular word in given language will be utilised and 
it should be hard to distinguish whether these words are added with 
steganographic purpose or they are strange Google Suggest service 
suggestions (like e.g. in Fig. 9), 
• R2: the same sequence of the bits of steganogram will not always be 
encoded with the same steg-suggestion word. 
 
To achieve these goals the following steps were taken while designing 
StegSuggest codebook (Fig. 10). Site www.wordfrequency.info contains a Fre-
quency Dictionary of Contemporary American English providing a list of the 
5000 most frequently used words in the language [20]. The dictionary is based 
about 400 million words corpus evenly balanced between spoken English (from 
radio and TV shows), fiction (books, short stories, movies scripts), more than 
100 popular magazines, 10 newspapers and 100 academic journals). The idea of 
the hidden data transfer using StegSuggest is to add words from the abovemen-
tioned top 5000 most frequently used English words to the original suggestions 
sent by Google. Each added word would carry some bits of steganogram. This 
would ensure fulfilling requirement R1.  
First, from the total of 5000 words we selected 4757 words (2542 
nouns, 1001 verbs, 839 adjectives, 340 adverbs and 35 quantifiers). The rest of 
the words like pronouns and prepositions were omitted because using them can 
be considered as suspicious because the steg-suggestions are added as the last 
word at each Google suggestion row sent. Second, the homographs (words that 
share the same written form but have different meanings) were deleted which 
left 4220 words. Next, we limited the list to 4096 most frequently used words. 
Based on these results the codebook was created, which consisted of four 
groups 1024 words each. The words were classified to the groups based on their 
popularity i.e. the most popular word was placed into first group, second popu-
lar word into second group, third popular word into third group etc. The aim 
was to create four groups with words of balanced popularity. With each word 
from the single group we are able to encode 10 bits of steganogram. To make 
detection harder each 10 bits sequence is represented by four words (one word 
randomly chosen from each of four groups). This allowed fulfilling requirement 
R2. Of course, once the word was randomly selected from the group and as-
signed to the particular bits sequence it cannot be chosen again to represent 
different bits sequence. 
 
 
Fig. 10 StegSuggest codebook design 
 
The designed codebook must be shared between steganograms sender 
and receiver to properly encode and decode secret data. 
 
5.3 StegSuggest messages and functioning 
StegSuggest operate based on three types of messages that utilize Google sug-
gestions. They are messages that: 
• acknowledge registration of the TCP connection that will be transfer-
ring Google suggestions, 
• carry steganogram bits, 
• close hidden channel. 
 
Each type of the message has its own format. Fig. 3 presented exempla-
ry real Google suggestions for the word ‘steganos’. Based on this example, we 
will show how StegSuggest adds and interprets steg-suggestions. First, notice 
that steg-suggestions are always added at the end of the single row which con-
tains original Google suggestion. Ten, random StegSuggest words were added 
to the suggestions from Fig. 3 and are presented in Fig. 11.  
 
Fig. 11 Google suggestions with steg-suggestions (in red) 
 
Besides introducing modifications to Google suggestions, StegSuggest 
also utilises modifications to WS and TS options from TCP header, which will 
be described in details later in this section. 
 
Now we will describe in what four phases does StegSuggest operate. 
They are: Phase 1 that requires creation, learning and updating of the Google 
Suggest servers list, Phase 2 that allows adding Google client-server connection 
to the list of TCP connections used by StegSuggest, Phase 3 in which ste-
ganographic data transfer is taking place and finally Phase 4 in which finishing 
of the hidden data occurs. The detailed description of each phase is presented 
below. 
 
Phase 1: Creating, learning and updating the Google Suggest servers list.  
This phase is necessary for SS and SR to later monitor and influence the TCP 
connections between Google Suggest client(s) and server(s). It is based on ana-
lysing DNS traffic: every time client asks for Google Suggest server, returned 
IP address is captured and stored until it expires (which is specified in the re-
sponse DNS message). 
 
Phase 2: Adding Google client-server connection to the list of StegSuggest 
connections.  
This is signalling phase in which SS and SR are establishing which Google 
Suggest connections will be transferring secret data. It requires registering par-
ticular TCP connections for steganographic purposes by both: SS and SR. This 
phase is necessary for the SR to distinguish which Google Suggest responses 
are carrying hidden data. Proposed TCP connection registration scheme is pre-
sented in Fig. 12.  
 
 
Fig. 12 Registration request of the TCP connection for steganographic purposes  
 
SR issues TCP connection registration request to the SS each time the 
TCP connection with one of the Google Suggest server is established. After 
receiving TCP segment with SYN flag which is directed from client to the 
Google server (Fig.12, 1), SR modifies TCP options fields: WS and TS. Both 
these options are used by StegSuggest to signal SS that this connection may be 
used for steganographic purposes if SS is ready to send secret data. It is then for 
SS to decide whether it will require new TCP connection for hidden data trans-
fer. 
TS option is modified by inserting into the field the value, which will 
be called a Steganographic Session Identifier (SSI). SS utilises SSI to 
acknowledge registration of the particular TCP connection. SSI which is calcu-
lated for the first TCP connection between the SS and SR has a special mean-
ing; it not only permits to register new TCP connection but also creates the 
hidden channel (which may include one or more registered TCP connections for 
steganographic purposes). This first SSI is called native SSI. Its value is stored 
to be later used while closing the hidden channel. The SSI is calculated as  
 
 (5-1) 
where H is a cryptographic hash function (e.g. MD-5 or SHA-1). The 
hash is computed on the following components: ISN – initial sequence number 
of the current TCP segment, HCK – a hidden channel key –  a number which is 
a shared secret between SS and SR and oWS – original value of WS option that 
was inserted by Google client (if TS is not present in the TCP segment then 
oWS=15). From the computed hash only 16 bits are chosen to form SSI. 
The modification of the WS option in the TCP SYN segment is decid-
ed based on algorithm presented in Fig 13. Values inserted by StegSuggest into 
WS option field were chosen based on their frequency occurrence in the real 
Google traffic (see Sec. 4) – WS that equals 1, 2, 3 and 6 were the most fre-
quently discovered values. Performed real Google traffic analysis also showed 
that if WS option was not present in the TCP header then also there was no TS 
option. That is why for all these cases WS=1. In case if both WS and TS are not 
present in the original TCP segment, then they are added by SR. This requires 
modification to the TCP Data Offset field and shortening of the Padding. At the 
SS side introduced modifications must be reversed.  
 
 
Fig. 13 WS modification algorithm  
 
After introducing all abovementioned modifications, SR sends the TCP 
segment to SS (Fig. 12, 2). From this time on, SR must change timestamps in all 
TCP segments directed from or to Google server. This means that SR saves the 
original values of the timestamps, and changes them whenever TCP segments 
are passed. In case that the influenced timestamp value returns to the SR, he/she 
restores the original one. This ensures that no inconsistency of timestamps is 
introduced. SR saves four values of the timestamps for segments that are di-
rected to the Goggle server: 
• TSOrigLast – which stores the original timestamp from the last seg-
ment sent to the Google server, 
• TSOrigCur – which stores the original timestamp from the currently 
processed segment, 
• TSStegLast – which stores the timestamp from the last changed seg-
ment sent to the Google server, 
• TSStegCur – which stores the timestamp from the currently processed 
changed segment. 
 
 (5-2) 
TSStegLast is inserted by SR into modified segment as an actual 
timestamp. Google server, in acknowledgment, sends a TCP segment in which 
echo timestamp is then changed at SR to TSOrigCur (Fig. 12, 6).  
After sending steganographic registration request message, SR waits 5 
seconds (which is an arbitrary value) for its confirmation. If registration it is not 
received (together with first steg-suggestions) then the TCP connection is not 
used for the steganographic purposes. 
After changing TS and WS options SS sends TCP segment into Google 
server direction (Fig. 12, 3). When the ACK segment is sent in response, it is 
modified when it reaches SR (Fig. 12, 6) by adjusting TS option value; analo-
gous operation is performed at (Fig. 12, 8) and other similar steps of StegSug-
gest. 
Next, SS based on the presence of the steganogram to send decides 
whether particular TCP connection will be registered and then used for ste-
ganographic purposes. It is achieved by analysing each TCP segment with SYN 
flag, analysing the WS and TS options in each segment to be more precise. SS 
verifies whether the TCP segment with SYN flag has proper SSI in the TS op-
tion. SSI is retrieved by performing several calculations based on eq. 5-1 for 
different WS values. SS discovers the value of the WS and then he/she reverses 
the algorithm from Fig. 13. For example, if SS finds out that in TCP segment 
with SYN flag WS=1, then he/she removes WS and TS options and then sends 
it to the Google Suggest server. If SS discovers that WS=6 then TS is left with-
),( TSOrigLastTSOrigCurTSStegLastTSStegCur −+=
),||||( oWSHCKISNHSSI =
out modification and only the value of the WS is changed to the original one 
(which is discovered based on the hash inserted by SR into TS option).  
The confirmation of the registration of the TCP connection for Steg-
Suggest purposes is performed by SS when the first set of suggestions is sent 
from the Google Suggest server (Fig. 16).  HTTP request which contains the 
first characters of the search phrase is modified by the SR (by adjusting TS 
option) and then sent further (Fig. 16, 1) without any changes to Google Suggest 
server. The server acknowledges the receipt of the request (Fig. 16, 2) and sends 
the first set of the suggestions (Fig. 16, 3). SS embeds into the first four rows of 
the suggestions list proper SSI (twice) - the same as in the registration of the 
TCP connection (Fig. 16, 4). The StegSuggest message that confirms registra-
tion of the TCP connection is presented in Fig. 14. 
 
Fig. 14 Confirmation of the TCP connection registration  
 
In Fig. 14, in the first two rows two steg-suggestions were added (cat 
and milk): first 16 bits that are encoded with forms SSI. The same role has steg-
suggestions added in third and fourth rows. The SSI is repeated twice to limit 
the chance of the case when original suggestions are mistaken with SSI.  
After receiving the first set of suggestions SR verifies the SSI by de-
coding the words from the four rows and comparing with the sent one. If it is 
correct two SSIs are removed and the TCP connection is treated from now on as 
registered. Next, modified segment is sent to the client (Fig. 16, 5) who con-
firms the reception of the suggestions with ACK segment (Fig. 16, 6). 
For all modified TCP segments for all StegSuggest operations certain 
fields related to size of the segment must be adjusted accordingly. They are: 
•  Total length field in the IP header, 
•  Sequence Number and Acknowledgement in the TCP header, 
•  HTTP Content-Length in the HTTP header. 
 
Phase 3: Steganographic data transfer. 
The mechanism of the steganographic data transfer is similar to acknowledge-
ment of the TCP connection registration presented in Phase 2. The only differ-
ence is that the SS adds steg-suggestions to the original suggestions sent by 
Google server.  
After receiving Google suggestions SS adds a single additional word to 
each row. Each of these words carries 10 bits of steganogram (see Sec. 5.2 for 
StegSuggest codebook creation). It is worth noting that usually there are 10 
rows of suggestions generated. But sometimes there are fewer for rare or long 
search phrases. In such case, some additional fake rows can be inserted to obtain 
total of 100 bits of steganogram per single set of suggestions. Such fake row 
will begin with the search phrase and then the code word with steganogram will 
be added. 
When more than single TCP connection (related to Google Suggest 
service) is utilised by StegSuggest between the SS and SR then steganogram 
will be inserted by SS into segments with the order of their arrival. However, to 
ensure proper assembly of the steganogram at the SR side from different seg-
ments with steg-suggestions numbering of the parts of the steganogram is re-
quired. It is achieved by inserting additional code word in rows 2 and 5. The 
total of 20 bits available will allow transferring 1 048 576 parts of steganogram. 
From all values of the sequence numbers only all-zeros value is reserved for 
closing the hidden channel (see Phase 4). The initial value of the sequence 
number starts at 1 and when it reaches 1048576 then it is again set to 1. Fig. 15 
shows format of the message that carry steganograms. Red steg-suggestions 
transfer steganograms, green encodes steganogram sequence number. 
 
 
Fig. 15 StegSuggest message format for steganograms transfer 
 
In the next step, Google suggestions together with steg-suggestions are 
sent by SS to SR (Fig. 16, 4). After successful reception of the suggestions list, 
SR first decodes sequence number, removes it and then decodes steganogram 
(and removes it too). Only original Google suggestions are then sent to the cli-
ent (Fig. 16, 5). 
 
 Fig. 16 Steganogram transfer using StegSuggest 
 
Phase 4: Finishing hidden data transfer. 
The finish of the hidden data transfer is equivalent with closing the hidden 
channel. When SS wants to end secret communication he/she issues two signal-
ling messages that are encoded into original Google suggestions. It is two-step 
process. First, the end of the secret data is signalled by changing the sequence 
number of the steganogram in the list of suggestions to 0 (as mentioned in Phase 
3). Then the message that shuts the covert channel is issued (Fig. 17).  When SR 
discovers such message he/she ceases to insert parts of the steganogram into 
original suggestions. The overt communication between Google Suggest client 
and server continues but only timestamps at SR are still modified until particu-
lar TCP connection is finished. After that it is deleted from the registered TCP 
connections list. 
 
 
Fig. 17 StegSuggest message format for closing hidden channel 
 
Fig. 17 presents format of the message that is devoted to closing the 
hidden channel. Steg-suggestions in rows: 1, 2 and 3, 4 carry session identifier 
(in red). In fifth row the steg-suggestion that describes the number of bits sent in 
the last suggestions list (in green) is transferred (if it is required).  
 
5.4 StegSuggest steganographic bandwidth estimation 
Based on the analysis of the real Google Suggest traffic that was pre-
sented in Section 4, we will now assess potential steganographic bandwidth of 
the StegSuggest method. Experimental results show that each Google search 
involved, on average, sending of about 7 suggestion lists. Taking into considera-
tion that each list will carry 100 bits of secret data the average amount of ste-
ganogram per Google search is 700 bits. Thus, the more Google traffic is gener-
ated by users, the higher steganographic bandwidth. Our experimental results 
showed that the average user generated single Google search every three hours, 
which is rather rarely and it gives steganographic bandwidth of about 0.1 bit/s 
for single user which is not impressive. However, if StegSuggest is used for 
aggregated Google traffic (and this scenario is considered in this paper – see 
subsection 5.1) then the steganographic bandwidth increases e.g. for 100 users it 
is about 10 bit/s. Of course, our captured real network traffic cannot be treated 
as representative when it comes to Google Suggest service, as there are other 
network environments were the statistics of this kind traffic will be tremendous-
ly different, for example in hot spots, internet cafes or student dormitories. If SS 
and SR have access to such aggregated traffic then the resulting steganographic 
bandwidth can be considerably higher. 
6. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we presented a new steganographic method named StegSuggest 
which is the first network steganography solution that allows hidden data trans-
fer using Google search. As a hidden data carrier StegSuggest utilises Google 
Suggest service’s suggestions. It was estimated that it allows sending 100 bits of 
steganogram for every Google suggestions list. When steganogram sender and 
receiver have access to the aggregated Google Suggest traffic then it achieves 
decent steganographic bandwidth (about 10 bit/s). 
In December 2010 new service was introduced by Google in its search. 
It is called Google Instant [22] and shows search results while user is still typing 
the search phrase. It is worth noting that Google Suggest after modifications is 
capable of utilising also Google Instant and it will presumably achieve higher 
steganographic bandwidth than for Google Suggest because the volume of data 
which is sent with every user’s keystroke is significantly higher. 
Future work will be focused on development of prototype of the Steg-
Suggest to prove the concept. Potential detection methods should also be dis-
cussed. 
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